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The Impact of EU-UK Brexit Negotiations on
the Irish Exporting Sector
Rawayda Abdou1*, Klavs Ciprikis2*, Lucía Morales3*✉, Damien Cassells4*
Abstract
The UK decision to leave the EU has larger implications for Ireland due to its historical
connections and significant exposure to the UK’s economy. As such, uncertainty derived from
Brexit negotiations and the variety of scenarios raise significant concerns regarding the
impact, the magnitude, and the lasting effects of the shock to the Irish economy. This study
explores the relationship between economic and political uncertainty surrounding Brexit and
its potential causal effects on the Irish economy with the support of Pesaran’s ARDL model.
The agriculture, manufacturing, chemical and pharmaceutical sectors are the focus of
attention as they are considered to be the most exposed to the UK market. The research
findings suggest that the manufacturing and food sectors would be the most impacted in the
short run with the rest of examined sectors following suit. The research findings are of
particular interest to stock market players and policymakers, who can gain a better
understanding of short-term dynamics on the Irish export sectors and their potential
implications for Ireland. This is especially important as we consider a double economic shock
due to the combined effects of Covid-19 economic shutdown and Brexit.
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1. Introduction
In June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU), leaving the
international community stunned by the Brexit outcome. The UK’s EU membership has
contributed to the country’s development as a large open economy that trades approximately
50 per cent of its goods and services with the EU (Crafts, 2017; Dhingra et al., 2017). Foreign
direct investment (FDI) is an important factor to the UK, as the country receives approximately
half of its £1 trillion of FDI from EU member states (Breinlich et al., 2016). However, despite
the economic and financial benefits that have materialised as a result of the country’s EU
membership, the UK constituents voted to leave the EU, jeopardising its close relationship
with its European counterparts and generating significant political and economic uncertainty
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across the country. The rise of political instability has led to strong waves that support
polarised interests, which exhibit serious toxic patterns and dynamics, with severe
consequences for democracy and pernicious consequences for society worldwide. The
emergence and relative consolidation of populist political trends are reflected in the way that
Brexit negotiations and the Global Health pandemic have been managed and the economic
chaos that they are causing. Although it is unclear to what extent the UK’s economy will be
affected after Brexit, a common consensus is that the country’s economy will experience a
negative shock that may persist for many years (Crafts, 2017). The International Monetary
Fund (2019) reports that the overall global impact of Brexit will result in 0.2 per cent reduction
as per insights presented in their 2019 global economic growth forecast. Such an impact
needs to be corrected due to global uncertainty derived from the Covid-19 economic tsunami.
Burdekin et al., (2018) and Adesina (2017) point to a $2 trillion loss experienced by global
equity markets, as a result of generated uncertainty by Brexit. European stock markets located
in countries with high levels of debt to GDP ratios like Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain recorded
strong negative reactions by falling 10 per cent, 14.5 per cent, 15.5 per cent and 14.4 per cent
respectively after the Brexit announcement.
Although the exact impact of Brexit on the Irish economy is unknown, the Irish government
and the main exporting industries need to be very active on their contingency plans to minimise
the negative shock, as they prepare for the UK’s departure from the EU. This is a very difficult
task due to the double economic blow faced by the Irish economy as Brexit and Covid-19 do
create the conditions of a perfect economic storm. By understanding the causal effects of
Brexit uncertainty on the Irish economy, policymakers and the most significantly affected
companies may take steps to prepare for the inevitable shock and gain a better understanding
of sectors that require swift interventions. The aim would be to inject appropriate economic
stimulus in the post Covid-19 era, seeking to generate positive spillover effects that soften the
magnitude and lasting effects of the double economic shock.
The impact of political uncertainty on the economy and the financial system has been the
subject of study by many academics and analysts. Research findings indicate that global
financial markets are affected by economic and policy-related uncertainty due to the
generation of negative spillover effects with short, medium and long-term lasting effects
(Antonakakis et al., 2013; Chung and Chuwonganant, 2014; Liu and Zhang, 2015; Wang et
al., 2014 Andreasson et al., 2016; Arouri et al., 2016; Beckmann and Czudaj, 2017; Sarwar
and Khan, 2017; Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2018; Chiang, 2019). The extant
literature suggests that higher levels of political uncertainty lead to significantly higher stock
market volatility and that market expectations are not only affected by economic and political
uncertainty, but also by the degree of future economic policy anticipation (Liu and Zhang,
2015; Beckmann and Czudaj, 2017). Within this context, this study is supported by a
methodological framework that examines the political uncertainty surrounding Brexit and its
impact on the Irish stock market, as well as on main Irish exporters. The main goal is to identify
potential causal effects derived from long and confusing Brexit negotiations through the
analysis of stock prices short-run dynamics. Furthermore, this study seeks to aid in
understanding the impact of Brexit on the Irish economy before the health crisis struck. This
research paper is significant as it offers insights on the implications of the Brexit economic
shock that need to be considered in parallel with the impact of Covid-19, as policymakers
design their economic stimulus programme for Ireland.
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2. UK – Ireland Trade
There is no doubt that Brexit uncertainty is having and will continue to have a significant impact
on economies that have close ties to the UK, where Ireland is identified as the country with
the highest level of exposure to the UK’s economy (Belke et al., 2018). Ireland is a small open
economy significantly linked to the UK’s economy. For example, the UK is Ireland’s largest
single-country destination for exports and an important importer of British goods and services
(see Figure 1 below). Ireland exports represent approximately €39 billion worth of goods and
services to the UK per year (Department of Finance, 2017). In this regard, the main Irish
exporters affected by Brexit and with the greatest economic importance in Ireland are identified
in the food and beverages, manufacturing, pharmaceutical and chemicals sectors (see Figure
2 below). These sectors rely on up to 20 per cent of total turnover from the UK (Department
of Finance, 2017). Consequently, trade disruptions due to Brexit may result in up to 4 per cent
reduction in Irish GDP during the first year (Central Bank of Ireland, 2019). Furthermore,
Ireland is the only country within the EU that shares landmass with the UK, which enables
over half of Ireland’s total exports to use the UK as a land bridge for transporting goods to
Europe. As a result, post-Brexit transit traffic between the UK and Europe would be affected
by causing significant delays, increasing costs and reducing trade transactions, all of which
would have a major impact on Irish exporters (Lawless and Morgenroth, 2017). The
significance of the negative effects of Brexit is a source of major concern to the Irish economy
and its key economic sectors and it is an aspect that needs to be added to the enormous
economic disruption derived of Covid-19 when trying to understand Ireland’s economic
contraction.
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Figure 2: Irish exporters exposed to UK trade
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information see the Department of Finance (2017).

3. Brexit and Ireland
The exact long-term economic implications of Brexit on the Irish economy will depend on the
final separation agreement and on the capabilities of the Irish government to enable policies
that help to soften the foreseeable shock. This might be done by helping core exporting sectors
to address their lack of diversification and excessive dependence on its nearest neighbour
economy, the UK. However, existing research points out to major difficulties when trying to
forecast the effects of Brexit on the Irish economy, and as such policymakers are facing a
17 | P a g e
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complex task as they seek to enable appropriate economic measures, guidelines and policies
that prepare the country for the economic and business shock. For example, Bergin et al.,
(2017) indicate that the level of real Irish output will be between 2.3 and 3.8 per cent below
what it would be if the UK does not leave the EU. A report by the Central Bank of Ireland
(2019) suggests that a no-deal Brexit could reduce real Irish output by 6.1 per cent over the
next decade, as compared to a free-trade deal, which could reduce output by approximately
1.7 per cent. Barrett et al., (2015) find that Brexit is likely to result in approximately 20 per cent
reduction in bilateral trade between the UK and Ireland since the UK is leaving the EU’s freetrade agreement. Furthermore, Bergin et al., (2019) estimate a fall in Irish exports to the UK
by approximately 31 per cent. Such trade implications may result in approximately 4 per cent
reduction in Irish GDP in the first year after the UK formally leaves the EU under a scenario
without a trade agreement (Department of Finance, 2017). Existing research clearly shows
the difficulties faced by economists and analysts when trying to forecast the length, magnitude,
and implications of Brexit to Ireland, which justifies the need for further research studies in the
area.
4. Research Findings
4.1 Brexit Timeline and Volatility Association
The UK’s decision to leave the EU led to a very complex process characterised by continuous
clashes between the UK and the EU negotiators. Serious disagreements have emerged in the
area of international trade, which has contributed to further deterioration of the UK and EU
relations ahead of a post-Brexit deal. Table 1 below summarises the key dates and events
associated with the UK’s decision to trigger EU’s article 50. The separation process started
with the outcome of the UK referendum to leave the European Union on June 23, 2016. The
referendum outcome led to a significant upsurge of market uncertainty in the European and
global financial markets, with stock exchanges materialising significant loses over a short
period of time (Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2018). The ISEQ All Share Index reacted
to the referendum outcome registering a significant fall on prices. This was followed by
increasing levels of uncertainty, which materialised on the FTSE100 Index fluctuations and
the £/€ exchange variations, illustrated in figure 3 below.
Table 1: Brexit Timeline 2016-2020
Date
June 23

Year
2016

Key Events
The United Kingdom voted to leave the
European Union

July 27

2016

Michel Barnier is named as the EU’s Brexit
Chief Negotiator

October 2

2016

EU’s Article 50 was triggered

Notes
Majority of Voters voted to “leave the EU”
with a very close result: 52 to 48%
supporting Brexit
Mr Barnier appointment as the chief
negotiator was communicated by the
president of the European Commission
that indicated: “Michel is a skilled
negotiator with rich experience in major
policy areas relevant to the
negotiations…” Mr Barnier experience as
former EU Commissioner and French
foreign minister were identified as key
attributes to guide the negotiation
process
The UK’s Prime Minister communicated
to the Conservative Party that the exit
process was in motion
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The UK’s High Court ruled that article 50
cannot be triggered without parliamentary
approval
The UK’s prime minister sent a letter to the
European council triggering Article 50
The EU and UK negotiators start Brexit's official
talks

November 3

2016

March 29

2017

July 17

2017

December 8

2017

September 21

2018

November 25

2018

The UK and EU strike a deal on the UK’s exit
terms

January 30

2019

March 20

2019

The UK parliament gives its prime minister a
mandate to seek for alternative arrangements
to the Irish backstop
The British Prime minister is obliged by
parliament to ask the EU to delay Brexit from
March 29 until June 30.

July 23

2019

The UK’s Conservative party changed leader

August 28

2019

The UK’s Parliament was prorogued, or
suspended for five weeks

October 10

2019

October 22

2019

The UK and Irish prime ministers announced a
“pathway to a possible deal”
The UK’s prime minister puts Brexit legislation
on “pause” citing MPs’ obstacles

December 12

2019

UK’s general elections led to a convincing win
by Boris Johnson conservative party

January 31

2020

The UK officially leaves the EU

Breakthrough on Brexit negotiations after
weeks of deadlock
The UK Chequers plan was criticised by EU
Leaders. EU leaders meet and the European
Council and the President indicated that the UK
exit plan will not work

The decision was confirmed by the
Supreme Court
The date for the UK’s departure was set
two years forth – March 29, 2019
The UK faced significant political
instability and the conservative party lost
its majority at the general election on
June 8
The UK and EU published a joint report
outlining progress on key issues
The EU communicated concerns
regarding the UK proposed exit plan
highlighting issues regarding the single
market and problems concerning the Irish
border
The deal was signed off by leaders of the
EU27 member states but needed the
approval of the UK and European
parliaments to take effect
A period of recurrent extensions started
as the UK negotiations with the EU
progressed
Uncertainty around Brexit negotiations
started to build up as the process moved
towards a phase of delays and recurrent
extensions
Boris Johnson won the Tory leadership
and he became the UK’s new prime
minister
The period of uncertainty continued as
the UK new prime minister is not able to
secure a deal with the EU
Few days after this announcement, Brexit
deals negotiations were put on hold
In October, the UK and the EU
announced a new Brexit deal, but a new
delay took place and Brexit legislation
was put on standby.
The UK and the EU negotiations were on
a process of standby until January 31
2020
An 11-month transition phase began.
This face was disrupted by the global
impact of Covid-19

Quite remarkable, overall volatility levels associated with the ISEQ All Share Index do not
seem to react to Brexit negotiations uncertainty. The ISEQ registered a significant rise in
volatility once the referendum result was communicated. But afterwards (see figure 3 and 4
below) volatility levels did not record significant fluctuations until Covid-19 struck the European
Union (hitting Italy first), and decisions to put the Irish economy into hibernation were taken.
The impact of Covid-19 was captured by raising levels of volatility from February 25, 2020,
onwards, offering initial signs of the potential magnitude of the unfolding economic and
financial shock associated with the global health crisis.
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Figure 3: Volatility Analysis

Figure 4: Volatility Analysis
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4.2 Econometric Modelling Findings
The methodological framework is focussed on the analysis of Irish exporting companies listed
in the ISEQ All Shares index. To capture Brexit negotiations and derived uncertainty, the study
integrates four measures of political uncertainty; namely, the UK’s Economic Policy
Uncertainty index (EPUi) developed by Baker et al., (2016), the Implied Volatility Index of S&P
500 (VIX), and the GBP/EUR exchange rate and the FTSE 100 Index. The time period under
consideration spans from January 2015 to April 2019, and the data frequency is daily. The
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main results5 from the econometric modelling indicate that in the short run, the manufacturing
sector is significantly exposed to the UK’s stock market and currency fluctuations. On the other
hand, the key findings suggest a lack of causal effects from the UK political uncertainty index
(EPUi) and the global uncertainty index (VIX) except for a few companies (Kingspan and CRH)
that seem to react to global uncertainty (VIX) rather than to regional dynamics, raising some
initial concerns about the EPUi suitability as a proxy that properly captures the effects of
regional uncertainty. Turning to the food sector, its behaviour is analogous to the one exhibited
by the manufacturing sector. The results show a significant effect of the FTSE 100 and the
British Pound in all companies that belong to this sector, except for Donegal. However, the
empirical analysis reveals insignificant results for the EPUi and VIX that are the proxies for
regional and global uncertainty. Interestingly, the results are indicating that Irish exporting
sectors are not reacting to the proxies measuring regional and global uncertainty. The UK
stock market and currency appear to be the conduits of volatility to the Irish stock exchange,
and heavily exporting sectors. The results for the pharmaceuticals sector are interesting and
surprising, as there is a lack of evidence of significant causal effects from the FTSE 100, the
British Pound, the EPUi, and the VIX. A possible reason for this is that the Irish pharmaceutical
and chemical sectors are heavily exposed to the UK uncertainty in terms of employment
(Department of Finance, 2017). Pharmaceutical companies performance might react in a later
stage due to economic lag effects associated with unemployment levels.
Overall, the research outcomes suggest that the Irish trading sectors do not seem to react to
the UK’s economic and political uncertainty nor global measures of uncertainty throughout the
study. However, these important trading sectors do react to market instability represented by
the FTSE 100 and the British Pound variations, confirming Ireland’s sectoral exposure to the
economic fate of its nearest neighbour (Belke et al., 2018). Irish exporters are affected by the
British Pound volatility and, as a result, market instability derived from currency fluctuations is
identified as a core variable to be monitored in the short-run. This is due to its impact on
investment plans, decision-making processes and hedging strategies, which seek to minimise
risk exposure (Ibec, 2016). The study points out to the inability of the EPUi and the VIX to
capture political uncertainty regarding Brexit, indicating that these two indexes are not able to
offer any insights concerning regional and global implications of Brexit in the context of this
study. The UK’s decision to leave the EU shows that the British Pound is the key conduit of
shock and spillover effects towards key Irish trading sectors in the short-run. This signals the
importance of currency fluctuations and the need for close monitoring and engagement with
currency hedging strategies that seek to ameliorate the effects of short-run exposure.
Perhaps, and more importantly, this paper findings highlight the vulnerability of the
manufacturing and food sectors to external economic shocks. Amid the Covid-19 pandemic,
this highlights the importance of early government actions and interventions to support these
vulnerable sectors. This could minimise the impact of the double shock faced by the Irish
economy as a result of Brexit ongoing negotiations and the economic tsunami derived from
the Global Health Crisis.

5

See table 2 in the appendix.
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5. Conclusion
The main research findings suggest that the British Pound is the main driver of uncertainty in
the Irish manufacturing and food-exporting sectors in the context of Brexit. On the other hand,
the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors are not affected by any of the underlying variables,
despite being identified as sectors significantly exposed to Brexit. Since the pharmaceutical
and chemical sectors are largely exposed to Brexit in terms of high labour intensity, the effect
of Brexit may take longer to affect market performance and as such, policymakers might
consider labour market adjustment in the long term, due to the lagging effects associated with
this variable. Given that the UK’s exit from the EU is expected to have a noticeable impact on
the British Pound and the FTSE 100 (HM Treasury, 2016), the research findings highlight the
importance of developing appropriate policy and industry measures. These could help soften
the impact of Brexit on Irish exporting sectors that are significantly exposed to the fortunes of
the UK economy (Department of Finance, 2017). The findings of this study make an important
contribution as they identify specific exporting industries in Ireland that are significantly
exposed to the UK and that will be significantly affected by the Brexit outcome. The Irish
government should consider policy and strategic decisions that aim to support affected
companies to help to minimise the impact of the economic shock. Policymakers should also
focus on minimising potential losses and negative impacts on Irish exporters operations, due
to their significant spillover effects on Irish macroeconomic fundamentals. The EU may also
play an active role by securing a safer post-Brexit economic position for Ireland, by facilitating
trade activity between the island and mainland Europe. This would aid Irish exporters on their
strategies to lessen their exposure to the UK economy. At the same time, the EU-UK Brexit
negotiations could contribute to building up the resilience of the Irish exporting sector and to
enable much-needed economic diversification. The Irish economic model requires significant
changes, and the dual economic shock (Brexit and Covid-19) bring an interesting period of
economic transition with important economic opportunities whatever sort of Brexit emerges.
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Appendix
Methodological Research Framework
Data Insights
The research sample integrates the ISEQ All-Share index and share prices for companies
listed in the ISEQ, which belong to the food and beverages, manufacturing and pharmaceutical
sectors, and have no missing observations during the period of the study. These criteria
resulted in a sample of 13 companies. The selection of sectors that are most exposed to the
Brexit outcome is based on the Irish Department of Finance “exposure index” (Department of
Finance, 2017). Daily stock market data for each company listed in the selected sectors were
retrieved from DataStream from January 2015 to April 2019. The research sample was limited
to April 2019, which enabled us to gauge the effects of uncertainty derived from Brexit
negotiations. To minimise the impact of granted extensions to the UK (the EU granted different
extensions for Brexit negotiations. The period of extensions started in March 2019 and were
followed by new extensions with lasting effects to mid-2020 where negotiations restarted as
they were on halt due to the impact of Covid-19 and its global economic disruption (see figure
4 below and figure). For robustness purposes, the study integrates four measures of political
uncertainty; namely, the UK’s Economic Policy Uncertainty index (EPUi) developed by Baker
et al., (2016), the Implied Volatility Index of S&P 500 (VIX), the GBP/EUR exchange rate and
the FTSE 100 Index. The outlined variables are used as proxies to capture Irish companies’
exposure to uncertainty as a result of the Brexit outcome. The GBP/EUR and the FTSE 100
Index are utilized as proxies for the market sentiment that capture political uncertainty, while
the EPU and VIX are proxies that seek to capture regional economic and political uncertainty
and global uncertainty respectively. The sample is restricted to the period beginning of 2015
to avoid disruptions and market lasting effects lasting as a result of the Global Economic and
Financial Crisis of 2008 (Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2018), yielding a total of 1,116
observations.
By integrating the EPU and the VIX indexes in this study, it was possible to examine the
exposure of the Irish stock exchange and its core export sectors to market instability generated
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by the Brexit outcome (Belke et al., 2018). Figure 4 below shows some reaction of the FTSE
100 volatility index and the GBP/EUR after the referendum, which can be explained by growing
levels of uncertainty and raising frictions in the negotiation process between the UK and the
EU. Volatility patterns are characterised by short-lived effects, with the UK currency being
more sensitive to uncertainty levels (Plakandaras et al., 2017; Sita, 2017).
Figure 4: Financial Indicators and Proxies

Figure 5: FTSE 100 Volatility Index and Exchange Rate Fluctuations.

Econometric Modelling
This study utilises the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL) developed by Pesaran
and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al., (2001) due to its methodological advantages over other
cointegration frameworks for the following reasons: i) unlike other cointegration approaches
such as the Engle and Granger (1987) two-stage procedure or Johansen's (1991) multivariate
framework, the ARDL approach does not require the time series to be mutually integrated of
order I(1) as a pre-requisite, the ARDL framework permits to test for cointegration even when
the variables are purely I(0), purely I(1) or mutually cointegrated which help to avoid any
potential "pre-testing bias". However, this approach is not valid if the series are integrated of
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order 2 i.e. I(2) variables; ii) The ARDL bound testing approach performs exceptionally well in
small sample sizes and aspect that needs to be considered in the context of this study as daily
data was chosen and the research sample cannot be considered as a small sample; iii) The
long-run and short-run relationship are estimated simultaneously; iv) contrary to the Engle and
Granger (1987) approach, the ARDL bounds testing allows to test hypothesis on the coefficient
estimates of the long-run relationship, it solves for the endogeneity problems and provide
unbiased long-run coefficients estimate (Narayan, 2005). Following Pesaran et al., (2001) the
equations below identify the cointegration and causal models that were implemented:
𝑛2
𝑛3
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝑛1
𝑖=1 𝛽1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=0 𝛽2 ∆𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=0 𝛽3 ∆𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑡−1 +
𝛽6 𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜀1𝑡
(1)
𝑘2
𝑘3
𝑘4
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝑘1
𝑖=1 𝛼1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=0 𝛼2 ∆𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=0 𝛼3 ∆𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=0 𝛼4 ∆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑖 +
∑𝑘5
𝑖=0 𝛼5 ∆𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛼6 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛼7 𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛼8 𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛼9 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛼10 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀2𝑡

(2)

Where Δ is the difference operator; 𝑦𝑡 denotes the dependent variable (the ISEQ Stock Index
and the stock prices of the selected 13 exporting Irish companies). Equation (1) examines the
relationship between market performance and the FTSE 100 index and the GBP/EUR
currency as proxies for Brexit uncertainty. The model is augmented in Equation (2) to include
the EPUi and VIX indexes as measures of domestic UK political uncertainty and global
uncertainty respectively. In the case that cointegration relationships are identified through the
implementation of equations (1) and (2), short-term causal dynamics would be examined by
estimating an Error Correction Model (ECM) outlined in equations (3) and (4) below.

𝑝
𝑝1
𝑝2
Δ 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎0 + ∑𝑖=1 𝑎1 Δ𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=0 𝑎2 Δ𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑖=0 𝑎3 Δ𝐺𝐵𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑎4 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡

(3)
𝑠2
𝑠3
Δ 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑏0 + ∑𝑠𝑖=1 𝑏1 Δ𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝑠1
𝑖=0 𝑏2 ∆FTSE + ∑𝑖=0 𝑏3 ∆GBP + ∑𝑖=0 𝑏4 ∆EPU +
∑𝑠4
𝑖=0 𝑏5 ∆VIX + 𝑏6 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡

(4)

Relevant diagnostic tests were conducted to examine serial correlation, non-normal errors,
heteroscedasticity, and functional form misspecification through the LM test, Jarque-Bera,
White test, and Ramsey’s Reset test, respectively. Overall, the ARDL models fit reasonably
well, being correctly specified and showing evidence of robust errors for serial correlation. In
terms of heteroskedasticity and normal error tests, the results indicated that the models were
not able to consider asymmetric and non-linear effects.
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Table 2. Unit Root Tests and Results from Bounds Test

Variables

Unit Root Tests
Levels
ADF
PP
KPSS

Unit Root Tests Returns
ADF

PP

KPSS

31.091***
33.031***
31.607***
20.717***
26.537***
31.991***
33.184***
32.977***
29.167***

-31.227***

0.161

-33.230***

0.053

-31.607***

0.114

161.594***
-36.792***

0.500**

-32.203***

Model 1

Model 2

ARDL
Optimal
Lags
(6,1,6)

Cointegration
Decision

ARDL
Optimal
Lags
(6,1,6,0,4)

Cointegration
Decision

0.026

(4,6,4)

-33.893***

0.148

(4,1,2)

-33.161***

0.103

(1,6,1)

No
Cointegration
No
Cointegration
Cointegration

(4,6,4,6,4)

No
cointegration
No
cointegration
No
cointegration
No
cointegration

-42.889***

0.141

(5,1,2)

No
Cointegration

(5,1,2,0,0)

Iseq

-3.234**

-3.1159**

0.889***

FTSE100

-1.871

-1.742

2.430***

GBP

-1.176

-1.131

3.501***

EPU

18.087***
-5.623***

0.698
0.443*

Kingspan

5.788***
5.821***
-1.144

-1.023

4.181***

CRH

-3.034**

-2.806*

1.369***

Smurfit

-2.412

-2.291

1.515***

Abbey

-2.893**

-2.931**

1.1493***

Mincon

-1.005

-1.130

3.752***

24.228***

-38.081***

0.059

(4,0,4)

No
Cointegration

(4,0,4,0,0)

No
cointegration

C&C

-2.289

-2.304

2.327***

-34.654***

0.037

(1,1,1)

-0.099

0.032

3.480***

-47.328***

0.259

(4,0,0)

Glanbia

-3.398**

0.961***

-36.787***

0.148

(2,1,2)

No
cointegration
No
cointegration
Cointegration

Kerry

3.604***
-1.752

No
Cointegration
No
Cointegration
Cointegration

(1,1,1,0,2)

Donegal

-1.516

3.394***

-36.401***

0.051

(2,2,2)

Origin

-2.373

-2.272

2.482***

-35.735***

0.051

(2,6,3)

Aryzta

-1.324

-1.314

3.899

34.676***
29.101***
36.171***
35.628***
35.658***
34.363***

-34.364***

0.034

(2,2,1)

VIX

Cointegration

Model 1
Adjustment
ECT
-0.007***

No
Cointegration

Model 2
Adjustment
ECT

0.019

No
Cointegration
Cointegration
No
Cointegration

(4,1,2,0,1)
-0.015***

(1,6,1,0,4)

(4,0,0,1,0)
-0.0214***

(2,1,2,0,0)
(2,2,2,0,1)

-0.0194***

(2,6,3,0,5)
(2,2,1,0,0)

-0.0208***

No
Cointegration
In at 2.5%
No
Cointegration
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Amryt
Mainstay

5.745***
-1.087
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-5.963***

1.540***

-0.721

1.500***

37.619***
12.085***

-38.475***

0.041

(1,0,0)

Cointegration

-32.996***

0.196

(6,0,0)

No
Cointegration

-0.0465***

(1,0,0,0,0,)

Cointegration

(6,0,0,2,0)

No
cointegration

-0.0501***

*This table presents the main results from selected tests to check time series properties and econometric models selection. *, **,*** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level,
respectively.
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Table 3. Results of short-run Granger Causality

Variables
ISEQ

Model 1
FTSE
GBP
Yes
Yes

FTSE
Yes

Model 2
GBP
EPUi
Weak Causality
No

Manufacturing Sector
Yes
Weak
Causality

Results Highlights
VIX
Weak Causality

Kingspan

Yes

Yes

Yes

CRH

Yes

Yes

Yes

yes

No

Yes

Smurfit

Yes

Yes

Weak
Causality

Yes

No

Weak Causality

Abbey

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Mincon

No

yes

No

No

No

No

C&C

Yes

Yes

yes

yes

No

yes

Yes

Model one and two captures ISEQ
exposure to the FTSE 100 and the Sterling
with lack of causal effects from economic
and global uncertainty.
Model one and two highlight Kingspan
exposure to the FTSE 100, the Sterling and
the VIX and weak causality from the UK
EPUi.
Model one and two show CRH exposure
to the FTSE 100, the Sterling and the VIX
and no causality from the UK EPUi.
Model one and two indicate Smurfit
exposure to the FTSE 100, the Sterling and
weak causality from the VIX. While no
causality was found from the UK EPUi.
Model one and two captures ISEQ
exposure to the FTSE 100 and the Sterling
and no causal effect from economic and
global uncertainty.
Model one and two show that Mincon is
only responsive to the sterling with lack of
causal effect from the FTSE, UK economicpolitical uncertainty and global
uncertainty.

Food Sector

Model one and two captures C & C
exposure to the FTSE 100, the Sterling and
The VIX with lack of causal effects from
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Donegal

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Glanbia

Yes

Yes

yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

yes

No

Weak Causality

Kerry
Yes

Origin

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Weak Causality

Aryzta

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Amryt

No

No

No

No

No

No

Mainstay

No

No

No

No

No

No

the UK economic-political uncertainty
(EPUi).
Model one and two show that no causal
effects from the FTSE, The GBP, the VIX to
Donegal. While causality is running from
the UK EPUi.
Model one and two highlights Glanbia
exposure to the FTSE 100 and the Sterling
with lack of causal effects from economic
and global uncertainty.
Model one and two capture Kerry
exposure to the FTSE 100 and the Sterling
with lack of causal effects from economic
and global uncertainty.
Model one and two reveal that Origin is
significantly exposed to the FTSE 100 and
the Sterling with lack of causal effects
from economic and global uncertainty.
Model one and two captures Aryzta
exposure to the FTSE 100 and the Sterling
with lack of causal effects from economic
and global uncertainty.

Pharmaceutical Sector
Model one and two show that Amryt has
no exposure to the FTSE, the GBP, the
EPUi, and the VIX.
Model one and two reveal that the FTSE,
the GBP, the EPUi, and the VIX do not
affect Mainstay.

*The research findings are summarised in this table as the analysis generated more than 20 tables that cannot be integrated to the paper due to space limitations, however, outcomes are available
upon request.
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